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ESSAY
The Trouble with Corporate
Conscience
James D. Nelson*
Accomplished corporate law scholars claim that modern
businesses need an infusion of morality. Disappointed by conventional
regulatory responses to recurring corporate scandal, these scholars
argue that corporate conscience provides a more fruitful path to systemic
economic reform. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, which held that for-profit
businesses can claim religious exemptions from general laws, the
Supreme Court gave this notion of corporate conscience added
momentum. Emboldened by the Court's embrace of business goals
extending beyond shareholder profit, proponents of a moralized
marketplace now celebrate corporate conscience as an idea whose time
has come.
This Essay criticizes the leading arguments for corporate
conscience. These arguments identify three plausible sources of corporate
morality-shareholders, managers, and society as a whole. Although
initially appealing, each account ultimately proves impractical,
illegitimate, or self-defeating. These shortcomings not only give us
reason to reject existing accounts on their own terms, but may also reveal
a more accurate and attractive picture of the modern corporate world.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, corporate America has been plagued by scandal.
From fraudulent accounting at Enront to safety shortcuts precipitating
the BP oil spill 2 to phony bank accounts at Wells Fargo,
3 public
corporations have grown accustomed to legal and ethical failure.
Predictably, corporate scandals beget tighter corporate regulations.
4
But the modern business world moves quickly, and sophisticated
market actors always seem one step ahead of systemic solutions.
5
Dissatisfied with conventional regulatory responses, prominent
corporate law scholars call for fundamental reform of the way we do
business.6 In their view, corporate leaders have been led astray by
1. See John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Behind Enron's Fall, a Culture of Secrecy
Which Cost the Firm Its Investors' Trust, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 5, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB1007502843500372680 [https://perma.cc/ASN7-WFH8].
2. See John M. Broder, BP Shortcuts Led to Gulf Oil Spill, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/science/earth/15spill.html [https://perma.cc/S49R-
UXJ7].
3. See Patrick W. Watson, Wells Fargo Scandal Shows Next Bank Crisis Coming, FORBES
(Sept. 15, 2016, 8:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickwwatson/2016/09/15/wells-fargo-
scandal-shows-next-bank-crisis-coming/#690162e
8 6 9 ec [https://perma.cc/F6PR-8CB3].
4. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (2002); Oil and
Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf-Increased Safety Measures for
Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 30 C.F.R. § 250 (2012); Rachel Witkowski &
Emily Glazer, Banking Regulator Imposes New Restrictions on Wells Fargo, WALL STREET J. (Nov.
19, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/banking-regulator-imposes-new-restrictions-on-wells-
fargo-1479519295 [https://perma.cc/8HHP-CZY7].
5. See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, 124 YALE L. J. 882, 1002 (2015) (describing the finance industry as "non-stationary").
6. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012) [hereinafter STOUT,
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH]; Lyman Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation, 1 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 83 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, Re-Enchanting]; KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006) [hereinafter
GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW]. Sadly, during the editing process for this Essay,
Professor Stout passed away at the age of sixty.
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financial economists' narrow focus on economic self-interest and have
lost touch with basic ethical principles. To remedy the excesses of our
capitalist system, these scholars propose that we confront the amoral-
or perhaps immoral-inclinations of modern business head on. What
we really need, on this account, is more corporate conscience.7
The Supreme Court recently gave this notion of corporate
conscience a shot in the arm. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Court held
that for-profit businesses qualify as "persons" under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act and are therefore eligible to claim religious
exemptions from general laws.8 Commentators supporting this result
made explicit reference to the idea of corporate conscience.9 Indeed, one
prominent scholar insisted that if we want businesses to act
responsibly, they "must have the freedom to follow their consciences."10
The appeal to conscience is rhetorically powerful. Debates about
"corporate social responsibility" and "social enterprise" have long been
hampered by a lack of semantic and conceptual clarity." But by
7. See, e.g., STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6, at ch. 8; Johnson, Re-
Enchanting, supra note 6, at 97; Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory,
56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 36 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Faithfulness]; GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at ch. 6; Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30
CONST. COMMENT. 309, 329 (2015) [hereinafter Greenfield, Corporate Persons]; Janet E. Kerr, The
Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility through a Legal Lens,
81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 832-34 (2008); Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 811 (2004); Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate
Conscience, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129 (2008); Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If IOnly
Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (2002); Marleen
A. O'Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the Fiduciary/Contract
Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit Employment Agreements, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW
219, 234 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal
Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility?, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007); Leo E.
Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course: The Tension Between Conservative
Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 390 (2015); Leo E. Strine,
Jr., Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement for Future Consideration From
Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165 (2017).
8. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
9. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Free Businesses to Act with Conscience, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 8,
2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinioni/2013/12/08/should-business-have-conscience/
cK6o6G6dwrWeRJjkluPVYMstory.html [https://perma.cc/6CKU-5FWJ]; Brett G. Scharffs, Our
Fractured Attitude Towards Corporate Conscience (Mar. 12, 2014),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2445680 [https://perma.cc/8TG4-Y7E8].
10. Glendon, supra note 9.
11. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Night-Watchman
State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 39 (2015) (criticizing Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice
Leo Strine's recent argument for corporate social responsibility); Elizabeth Pollman, Social and
Asocial Enterprise, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW (Benjamin Means
& Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2017) (arguing that social enterprise is a "particularly amorphous term,"
due in large part to its adoption by different organizations for varying purposes). More than a
decade ago, Professor Larry Ribstein observed that "the debate over corporate social responsibility
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focusing on the problem of corporations' seemingly hollow normative
core, theorists of corporate conscience have been able to coalesce around
a morally resonant vocabulary and employ it to challenge conventional
corporate theory. And in the short time since Hobby Lobby, these
challenges have gained considerable momentum. 12
This Essay tests the claims made by proponents of corporate
conscience. To do so, it engages the three most sophisticated models of
the argument, organized according to the source of corporate morality.
The first model grounds corporate conscience in the "prosocial" nature
of shareholders.13 The second model holds that managers hould make
business decisions by following their own deepest moral
commitments. 14 And the third model looks to the best interests of society
as a whole, rather than the interests of shareholders or managers
alone.15
Taking these models in turn, this Essay shows that each account
of corporate conscience falls short. Part I begins by arguing that it is
highly impractical to convert shareholders' moral values into corporate
policy. As a descriptive matter, the shareholder-conscience model does
provide helpful evidence of investors' prosocial impulses. But when it
comes to implementation, the shareholder-conscience model does not
identify practical mechanisms by which prosocial shareholders can
overcome pervasive collective action problems, nor does it demonstrate
that prosocial shareholders actually wish to do so.
Part II then explores the notion that rather than attempting to
vindicate shareholders' moral values, managers should instead make
business decisions in accord with their own deeply held convictions-
especially their religious beliefs. It identifies the most persuasive case
to be made in favor of this view, which focuses on allowing managers to
live coherent lives by bringing their full selves into the business world.
But these moralizing managers would also impose serious costs, both
is often vague or unrealistic or both." Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in
Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2006). Despite his best efforts, more
recent discourse about corporate social responsibility has not gained much in terms of clarity or
precision.
12. See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014); Brett H.
McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARiZ. L. REV. 777 (2015); see also Moral
Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (exempting certain for-profit businesses with "religious beliefs or
moral convictions" from the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive coverage mandate).
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
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on shareholders and on other members of the corporate group. These
costs, in turn, give us reason to question the legitimacy of managers
using corporate resources to pursue their own moral agendas.
Looking beyond shareholders and managers, Part III explores
the socialized model of corporate conscience. It begins by noting what
this model has in common with the conventional account of corporate
law, namely, a focus on social wealth as the ultimate end of the
corporate system. But when it comes to the means of achieving that end,
this Part argues that the socialized model goes awry. More specifically,
by advocating that corporate managers aim directly at social wealth,
rather than profit for their individual firms, this model ignores the
competitive structure of the modern market economy. This structure
encourages firms to compete in the hopes of increasing profits, and as a
result of that competition, prices move to the point at which resources
are allocated to their most valued uses. But without competition, the
price mechanism cannot function properly, and markets become,
distorted. Although this distortion and accompanying inefficiency.
might conceivably be justified on egalitarian grounds, the socialized
model does not make that case.
Finally, Part IV moves past theories of corporate conscience and
takes some initial steps toward locating an alternative source of
normative guidance for corporate practice. In different ways, the three
leading models founder on the institutional details of modern firms and
markets. But serious attention to these institutional details, and the
values embedded in them, reveals a better way forward. This approach
may not provide a comprehensive theory of corporate morality, but it.
does identify certain minimum requirements any such theory must
satisfy.
Conversations about morality in business have a tendency to
grow muddled. All too often, participants in these discussions talk past
each other, either because they do not share a single conception of
corporate responsibility or because they conflate multiple conceptions.
By zeroing in on three plausible sources of corporate conscience, this
Essay provides a common framework to facilitate deeper analysis. In
doing so, it also shows how the most prominent arguments for corporate
conscience fail to deliver a coherent and attractive view. This failure not
only gives us reason to reject existing accounts on their own terms, but
also leaves behind valuable clues for how to reconstruct a more




This Part explores the claim that corporate conscience can be
grounded in shareholders' interests. Although that claim rests on an
appealing view of shareholders' moral psychology, it ultimately fails to
account for powerful firm dynamics that block effective
implementation. A dose of corporate realism here reveals that the
shareholder-conscience view is highly impractical in modern
corporations.
A. Prosocial Shareholders
The first model of corporate conscience aims to challenge
conventional wisdom about shareholders.16 On this view, financial
economists and their allies in the legal academy have led businesses
astray by obsessing over shareholder wealth. Laboring under
unrealistic assumptions of investor selfishness and instrumental
rationality, managers have failed to respond to the diverse array of
values held by actual shareholders. Rather than resembling the
mythical creature homo economicus, shareholders are real people who
are more inclined to care about others than to ruthlessly pursue their
own material advantage at every turn. Accordingly, corporate
managers should be free to take their cues from prosocial shareholders
rather than remain the slaves of conventional economic theory."
The shareholder model begins with a rather expansive view of
"conscience." On this account, conscience functions as a sort of stand-in
for any behavior that is not strictly in pursuit of material gain. It even
covers situations in which individuals fail to exploit positive law or the
vulnerability of others to the maximum possible degree.18 In these
instances, people are theoretically leaving money on the table, which
can be seen as the functional equivalent of altruism.19 In focusing on
"other-regarding" behavior, the argument from shareholder conscience
largely casts aside inquiries into human emotion or motivation and
prioritizes observable evidence of social cooperation.2
0
16. See STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6.
17. See id. at 95-115.
18. See Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of 'Pay
for Performance," 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 528, 540 (2014) [hereinafter Stout, Killing Conscience].
19. See id.; see also M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the
Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 573 n.15 (2009) (defining altruism as including
instances in which corporations do not evade taxes).
20. See LYNN A. STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: How GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE
(2011) [hereinafter STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE]; Stout, Killing Conscience, supra note 18.
[Vol. 71:5:16551660
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In line with its emphasis on observable behavior, the
shareholder-conscience model offers various kinds of empirical evidence
in support of its claims.21 Some of this evidence comes in the form of
experimental studies designed to reveal the conditions under which
people will engage in unselfish behavior. These studies show that, at
least in social science laboratories, ordinary people do not consistently
choose to maximize their own material wellbeing. Instead, they
frequently act in a socially cooperative manner, seeking to benefit
others as well as themselves.22 This evidence is offered to demonstrate
that conventional economic models make unrealistic assumptions about
human behavior, which is much more inclined toward altruism and
fairness than we have been led to believe.
A second source of evidence for shareholder conscience is the rise
in socially responsible investments ("SRIs").23 SRIs seek to integrate
nonfinancial considerations-such as ethical, social, or environmental
concerns-into investment decisions.24 For example, Vanguard offers
investors the FTSE Social Index Fund, which screens investments
based on certain social, human rights, and environmental criteria.25
Some estimate that the total value of SRIs in the United States exceeds
$8 trillion.26 For shareholder-conscience proponents, the rise of SRIs is
yet more evidence that in addition to concerns for financial return, real
shareholders have serious moral and ethical commitments.
A third source of evidence for shareholder conscience is the
emergence of benefit corporations.27 Benefit corporations are for-profit
organizational forms that explicitly permit firm managers to promote a
wide range of social goals other than shareholder value.28 These hybrid
organizational forms now exist in over thirty states,29 including
21. See STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6, at 47-102.
22. See id. at 97; STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE, supra note 20, at 84-86.
23. See STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6, at 98.
24. See Joakim Sandberg et al., The Heterogeneity of Socially Responsible Investment, 87 J.
Bus. ETHICS 519 (2009).
25. See Vanguard Mutual Fund Profile: Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund Investor Shares,
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/snapshot?Fundld=0213&FundIntExt=INT (last visited
Sept. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Y79S-VFQC].
26. See US SIF, REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS
(2016), https://www.ussif.org/files/SIF Trends_16_ExecutiveSummary(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/
TLK4-JCET].
27. See STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6, at 98.
28. For a full list of benefit corporation legislation, see State by State Status of Legislation,
BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited July 21,
2018) [https://perma.ce/QCW9-LFAL].
29. See id. (displaying thirty-four states that have passed benefit corporation legislation).
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Delaware, the corporate law capital of the world.30 Much like the
evidence from experimental psychology and SRIs, the emergence of
benefit corporation legislation is said to prove that shareholders have
conscientious commitments that cannot be reduced to merely financial
terms. 31
In light of this empirical evidence showing that shareholders are
prosocial-that they have "consciences"-the shareholder-conscience
model holds that managers should have the discretion to respond to a
wider set of human concerns. In other words, if managers are to serve
shareholders' true interests, then they need to have wide latitude in
mediating among a more complex set of values.32
B. The Trouble with Shareholder Conscience
At first it might seem appealing to grant managers wide
discretion so that they can be responsive to shareholders' ethical
commitments. Indeed, proponents of the shareholder-conscience model
posit that, under ordinary corporate law, managers already have a free
hand to mediate various claims based on moral values.33 On this
account, managers must simply realize that they are not legally bound
to do the bidding of only the most profit-hungry investors.34 With this
proper understanding, managers can finally do what is best for real
shareholders.35
30. See 79 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361-368. See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing
Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681 (2013) (discussing legal forms that might help
social enterprise founders achieve their goals); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to
Do the Right Thing, 4 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 235 (2014) (discussing the conditions under which
Delaware's benefit corporation legislation can achieve its goals). For an argument that benefit
corporation legislation may actually sharpen the focus on shareholder wealth in ordinary
corporations, see James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461,
501 n.211 (2015).
31. See STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6, at 98.
32. See id. at 9.
33. See id. at 26-31; see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 772-75 (2005) (discussing managerial discretion); M. Todd
Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old Is New Again, in
CORPORATE LAw STORIES 37, 66, 75 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (same); Lyman Johnson & David
Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 10-15 (2015) (same).
34. See STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6, at 24-32.
35. In this Section, I focus on Professor Stout's argument that managers ought to vindicate
the prosocial views of corporate shareholders. See generally STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MYTH, supra note 6. Professor Stout also coauthored pathbreaking work on the role of corporate
stakeholders, see, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999), but I bracket those arguments here and reserve discussion of
stakeholder management for Part III of this Essay.
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But there are several reasons to be skeptical of this account. To
begin with, corporate law is only one of many constraints on managerial
behavior, and often not the most powerful.36 In addition to discipline
imposed by product markets, capital markets, and the market for
corporate control, there are also constraints that emerge from the
internal politics of firms-that is, the power dynamics among various
firm participants.37 It is one thing to pronounce that managers, acting
within the bounds of the business judgment rule, are legally free to
negotiate these dynamics as they please.38 It is quite another to say that
the political conditions of modern firms will permit them to do so.
The shareholder-conscience model is certainly sensitive to these
concerns.3 9 Indeed, its most prominent advocate, writing alone and with
others, has given a sophisticated account of firms' internal politics. 40
According to this account, managers must satisfy the minimum
demands of all corporate contributors to assure that they will continue
to participate in the firm's productive activities.41 But beyond meeting
these minimum demands, managers will respond to those participants
who muster the strongest "political forces" in their own favor.42 And so,
whether managerial discretion translates into actual decisions in favor
of shareholders' conscientious interests will turn on the political power
of shareholders upporting those interests.
On that question of power, it seems unlikely that managerial
discretion to serve shareholder conscience will amount to very much.
One reason is that shareholders who prefer firms to focus on financial
value have the advantage of homogeneity.43 That is, shareholders who
36. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980); Oliver D. Hart, The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14 BELL J. EcoN. 366
(1983); Bengt Holmstr6m, Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective, 66 REV. EcON.
STUD. 169 (1999); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
37. See HENRY HANSMANN, OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996); Gabriel Rauterberg,
Contracting within the Firm (Aug. 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
38. For skepticism about this legal claim, see James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1595-1600.
39. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 35.
40. See, e.g., id. at 282-83, 323-28.
41. See id. at 325.
42. Id.
43. See Hansmann, supra note 37, at 62-65 (discussing advantages that accompany
homogeneous interests); see also Lucian Arye Bebehuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARv. L. REV. 833, 891-92 (2005) (discussing shareholder homogeneity); Einer
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 799-800 (2005)
(discussing collective action problems faced by socially motivated investors); Larry E. Ribstein,
Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1449
(2006) (same).
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see the firms in which they invest primarily or exclusively as vehicles
to enhance their own wealth will not need to negotiate delicate matters
of conscience before they can exert their combined influence within the
firm. To put the point another way, this group of value-maximizing
shareholders has a built-in political advantage due to the low cost of
maintaining its internal lobbying coalition.4 4 As a result, it is very hard
for "conscience" investors to compete for management's attention.4 5
A proponent of the shareholder-conscience model might reply
that all (or nearly all) actual shareholders have a conscience, and so
firms are failing to deliver, even according to their own promises of
shareholder value.46 On this view, managers are burdened by
inaccurate and unhelpful social messages-or "myths"-telling them
that shareholders only value money.4 7 And shareholders themselves are
at least partly responsible by failing to see how their knee-jerk
emphasis on financial return actually works against their own best
interests.4 8 If we could only dispel (or deflate) these myths, which infect
both managerial and shareholder thinking, then we would be on the
path toward true shareholder value.49
While it may be the case that most shareholders have a
conscience, that proposition does not imply that most shareholders
want the corporations in which they invest to advance their various
ethical commitments. Take, for example, a firm in which the majority
of shareholders care deeply about criminal justice reform. On the
shareholder-conscience model, these socially conscious interests pass
through seamlessly to corporate management, which should then act to
integrate them into corporate conduct. But it is not at all clear that
shareholders actually want corporations to reflect their values so
seamlessly.
Instead, it is quite plausible to think that shareholders have
preferences with regard to ultimate social outcomes, but a separate set
44. For analogous arguments in the public choice literature, see, for example, JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
45. Indeed, some proponents of investor activism on social matters seem to concede that
significant legal reforms would be required to realize their goals. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Luigi
Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J. L. FIN. & AcCT.
247, 265-66 (2017) (suggesting reform of corporate voting to encourage ethical behavior).
46; See STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6, at 106-07.
47. See id. On the role of myth in contemporary corporate law scholarship, see Leo E. Strine,
Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors: A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological
Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014).
48. See STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6, at 106-07.
49. See id.
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of preferences with regard to which institutions pursue those goals.
That is, shareholders might very well endorse what has been called an
"institutional division of moral labor."50 Certain moral, social, or
political goals-like reforming the criminal justice system-may be
desired by most, or even all, of a firm's shareholders. But that does not
mean that those same shareholders want the firms in which they invest
to adopt these causes.
Indeed, there may be a number of different reasons why
shareholders prefer this kind of institutional division. Some
shareholders might think that business firms, and the managers who
run them, are not particularly qualified or competent to implement
corporate policy in service of broad notions of social justice.51 Others
might think that managers are competent to do so, but that they have
a comparative advantage in working to increase firm value, and that
they should accordingly allocate their scarce decisionmaking resources
to focus on that narrower goal. Finally, a shareholder might favor a set
of social or political projects, but also think that other institutions-like.
government or perhaps certain nonprofit organizations-might be more
democratically representative or otherwise legitimate agents for
pursuing those projects.52 The point is not that all shareholders will
agree with the institutional division of moral labor. Rather, the point is
that it is not so easy to move directly from the proposition that
shareholders have a deep and diverse set of values to the proposition
that those shareholders want business firms to be the institutional
agents attempting to vindicate those values.
Perhaps a proponent of the shareholder-conscience view would
reply that the distinction between personal ethics and institutional
decisionmakers leaves shareholders worse off. 5 3 That is, even if
shareholders separate their personal beliefs from the conduct of
50. See JOSEPH HEATH, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM: THE MARKET FAILURES
APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 94 (2014); see also THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 53-
56 (1991) (discussing the "moral division of labor"); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 284 (1993)
(discussing the need for "an institutional division of labor ... between the basic structure [of
society] and the rules applying directly to particular transactions"); Jukka Makinen & Arno
Kourula, Pluralism in Political Corporate Social Responsibility, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 649, 651-52
(2012) (discussing the division of moral labor); Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 34
PHILOSOPHIA 23 (2006) (same); Samuel Scheffler & V6ronique Munoz-Dard6, The Division of Moral
Labor, 79 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 229 (2005) (same).
51. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-34 (1962) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM]; Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is To Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970 [hereinafter Friedman, Social Responsibility].
52. See Waheed Hussain & Jeffrey Moriarty, Accountable to Whom? Rethinking the Role of
Corporations in Political CSR, 149 J. BUS. ETHICS 519 (2016).
53. See STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6, at 99-101.
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corporate affairs, those shareholders are in fact operating under a
debilitating ideology that works systematically against their
interests.54
This reply has the flavor of a claim that shareholders are
operating under some sort of "false consciousness," and that they would
behave differently if only they could better appreciate their own
situations.55 But like other arguments from false consciousness, there
are serious questions about who might have epistemic authority to
know better than shareholders what is actually good for them. And if
the answer is corporate managers, then we would need some account of
how they are supposed to determine, and mediate among, the diverse
and often irreconcilable conscientious commitments of shareholders.
If I am right that shareholders pressure managers to focus on
their wealth, not because shareholders fail to see what is good for them,
but instead because that is the vision they have for the firms in which
they invest, then the shareholder-conscience view appears to run out of
steam. That is, if a set of shareholders genuinely prefers to exercise
conscience through other institutional vehicles, and that set is large or
cohesive enough to exert its political power within the firm, then the
shareholder-conscience argument seems to disappear. Managers may
still have the discretion to promote shareholders' moral views, but those
same managers will consistently respond to constituents that can
exercise political power within the firm. And if it turns out that
financially focused shareholders can form effective coalitions, then the
shareholder-conscience model does not offer independent reasons,
grounded in political morality, to reject any result.56
At this point, proponents of the shareholder-conscience model
face a dilemma. On one hand, they can insist that the model is only
meant to be descriptive of the way that things actually are in
corporations. This account would say that shareholders are prosocial
people with a diverse set of values other than their own material
wealth, and that managers have a legal right to act in furtherance of
those interests. If it turns out that managers do not act this way, then
54. See id. at 100-02.
55. Foundational work on the idea of "false consciousness" dates back to KARL MARX &
FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY (1846). For a powerful critique of false consciousness
and its historical uses, see GUENTER LEWY, FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ESSAY ON MYSTIFICATION
(1982).
56. See David Millon, New Game Plan or Business As Usual? A Critique of the Team
Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1026 (2000) (arguing that the team-
production model of corporate law operates according to internal power relations rather than moral
principle); see also Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social
Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1234-35 (2002) (agreeing with Millon's assessment).
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shareholder-conscience theorists can identify the mechanisms by which
shareholders' personal values fail to translate to the corporation, but
they can "remain agnostic" on questions of justice.57 On the other hand,
proponents of shareholder conscience might make a "normative turn"
and argue that managers should use their discretion to promote a
broader set of shareholder values.
If the shareholder-conscience model is merely descriptive, then
it can only be judged on the accuracy of its factual claims. On that score,
social science provides strong evidence of prosocial norms, but there is
little evidence with regard to shareholders' preferences for the specific
role of corporations in achieving a more just society. The actual behavior
of investors in large public corporations, however, tends to show that
they prefer corporations to stay in their rather narrow financial lane.5 8
Now it might be that this behavior is the result of a collective action
problem among conscientious investors who do not agree on specific
moral goals and therefore have difficulty coalescing around a unified
activist strategy toward management.59 But it seems just as likely that
this behavior reveals shareholder preferences for an institutional
division between their conscientious commitments and the public
corporations in which they invest.6 0
This conclusion seems to hold even for those who invest in SRIs.
Proponents of the shareholder-conscience model are right to note that
there has been a dramatic rise in the amount of money flowing through
funds that integrate ethical, social, or environmental concerns. Yet SRI
funds still make up only a small fraction of total funds invested in public
companies.61 And socially committed investors often have a difficult
time discovering information that would be relevant to their morally
57. See Millon, supra note 56, at 1026 (stating that the team-production model of corporate
law is "agnostic on the question of just deserts").
58. See, e.g., New Analysis: Mixed Results for 2015 Proxy Season on Social and Environmental
Issues, SUSTAINABLE INVS. INST. 2 (Aug. 19, 2015), http://siinstitute.org/press/2015/
Si2_Press Release ProxyReview Aug 2015.pdf [https://perma.cclQ6TR-FV44] (reporting that,
in 2015, social and environmental shareholder proposals received an average of only twenty
percent support); cf. STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE, supra note 20, at 81-84 (acknowledging
limitations of experimental evidence on prosocial behavior).
59. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
60. For a discussion of "socially responsible investment" and how it tends to resemble
ordinary institutional investment, see Nelson, supra note 38, at 1590-91; and James D. Nelson,
Corporations, Unions, and the Illusion of Symmetry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1969, 2014 n.236 (2016)
[hereinafter Nelson, Illusion of Symmetry].
61. See Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 42 J. CORP. L. 217, 220 (2018); see also
Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1437
(2008) ("SRI assets remain small relative to the enormity of U.S. capital markets.").
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motivated investment objectives.62 As a result, empirical evidence tends
to suggest that the bulk of "socially responsible" investments-
especially those that flow through professional money managers-are
motivated more by a desire to manage risk in diversified portfolios than
by a desire to promote prosocial goals.63 In other words, it seems the
better explanation for the newfound popularity of SRIs has more to do
with overall financial performance than with conscience.64
The evidence concerning benefit corporations appears to point in
the same direction. Again, proponents of shareholder conscience are
right to note the remarkable popularity of these forms among state
legislatures.65 But that legislative popularity alone provides little
support for proponents' preferred model of corporate conscience.
To begin with, it is important to note that this legislation creates
an alternative organizational form for those who wish to integrate
nonfinancial concerns into their ordinary business affairs.66 Benefit
corporation legislation enacts distinct legal rules-separate from the
ones governing ordinary for-profit business firms-to govern businesses
with hybrid missions. Commentators often gloss over this critical point
in arguing that the rise in benefit corporation legislation shows that
businesses need not be so financially focused.67 Even Justice Alito
seemed to be drawn to that conclusion in his opinion for the Hobby
Lobby Court, pointing to benefit corporation legislation as evidence of
the "inherent compatibility between establishing a for-profit
corporation and pursuing nonprofit goals."6 8 But establishing a
separate organizational form-accompanied by an explicit disavowal of
ordinary fiduciary duty standards for corporate managers-provides no
support for reimagining the norms that govern firms organized as
conventional for-profit businesses.
Indeed, the recent rise in benefit corporation legislation may
actually serve to entrench shareholder primacy norms in ordinary
62. See Bruner, supra note 61, at 1438; Hirst, supra note 61, at 234-36.
63. See, e.g., John R. Nofsinger, Johan Sulaeman & Abhishek Varma, Institutional Investors
and Socially Responsible Investments: It Just Makes (Economic) Sense 4 (Wake Forest U.,
Working Paper, January 2016), http://capitalism.wfu.edulwp-content/uploads/2016/04/Varma-
paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9XY-3MJV] ("[Any tilt of institutional portfolios toward SRI is
driven by economic incentives instead of social values.").
64. See id. at 34 ("[Mlost [SRIs are] actually being driven by economic incentives and risk
management motives.").
65. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361-368 (2018) (Delaware law pertaining to the
establishment and governance of public benefit corporations).
67. See, e.g., STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6, at 98.
68. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).
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businesses. Proponents of the shareholder-conscience model argue that
there is simply no legal reason why social entrepreneurs cannot pursue
their prosocial agendas in traditional business firms.69 But the push for
alternative legal forms to accommodate hybrid businesses seems to
belie that notion. For example, the leading advocates of benefit
corporation legislation candidly acknowledge that ordinary corporate
law is not hospitable to mission-driven entrepreneurs and investors. In
fact, these advocates make that lack of hospitality a central feature of
the case in favor of adopting an alternative statutory scheme for social
enterprise.70 It would seem, then, that the rising popularity of benefit
corporations among state legislatures can be taken as a tacit
acknowledgement that ordinary business corporations are not supposed
to be primarily prosocial. Instead, this legislation may be better
understood as a means to channel entrepreneurs with conscientious
aspirations for their businesses into a more suitable legal form.71
Finally, one should not confuse the legislative popularity of
hybrid forms-which is undeniable-with their popularity among-.
entrepreneurs and investors. On this score, early returns suggest that
very few businesses are actually making use of such forms.72 Now this
marginal use of hybrid forms may simply provide evidence that social
entrepreneurs regard the standard corporate form as perfectly suitable
for their prosocial objectives.73 But it may also bolster the view that
many conscientious shareholders endorse some version of the
institutional division of moral labor.
69. See STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6, at 24-32; see also Lynn A. Stout,
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008) [hereinafter Stout,
Dodge v. Ford].
70. See, e.g., William H. Clark, Jr. & Larry Vranka, White Paper: The Need and Rationale for
the Benefit Corporation, BENEFIT CORP. 7-14 (Jan. 18, 2013), http:/fbenefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Benefit CorporationWhitePaper.pdf [https://perma.ccX63A-EMKF] (arguing that
"[e]xisting legal frameworks do not accommodate for-profit mission-driven companies").
71. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to Do the Right Thing, 4 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 235, 248-253 (2014). But see Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth
Maximization as a Function of Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 939, 964 (2017) (noting that "benefit corporation statutes typically include a provision
disclaiming any effect of benefit corporation statutes on the validity or interpretation of the for-
profit corporate law outside the benefit corporation context"). I thank Dana Brakman Reiser for
an exchange that helped me to develop this point.
72. See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 587 (2016)
("Currently, only a relatively small number of social enterprises have been formed .... ).
73. See David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit
Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461 (2017) (arguing that benefit corporation legislation
in Delaware should not be interpreted to exclude multistakeholder governance as a "menu option"
under ordinary corporate law).
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If the shareholder-conscience view is a normative model, rather
than a descriptive one, then we need to dig a bit deeper to determine its
moral grounding. The most plausible source of that moral grounding
would seem broadly utilitarian. We should grant directors wide latitude
to respond to shareholders' true interests, on this view, because that
latitude would promote overall shareholder welfare. A narrow focus on
financial value not only ignores shareholders' other-regarding
preferences, it also destroys firm value itself. But if managers are
insulated from the relentless pressure to increase quarterly profits, the
idea is that they can promote the long-term interests of the firm.74
This normative model escapes some of my earlier criticisms, but
it runs into serious difficulties of its own. The most significant is that it
seems to conflate the problem of short-termism with the question of
whether managers should promote the financial value of the firm. 7 The
worry about short-termism is that managers will make decisions that
may induce an immediate spike in share price but will ultimately
reduce the value of the firm in the long term.76 Although there is robust
debate about whether short-termism is really a problem,77 that debate
is not concerned with whether managers are supposed to act in
shareholders' financial interests in the first place. Instead, participants
in the short-termism debate tend to assume that managers should act
to maximize the present value of firms' future cash flows and simply
74. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on "Shareholder Primacy," 2 ACCT., ECON. & L. 1,
18 (2012); see also Laurence D. Fink, Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/
B93N-3U2R] ("To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver financial performance,
but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society.").
75. See Stout, supra note 74, at 18.
76. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective
on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1952
(2017) [hereinafter Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?].
77. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Bray & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015), Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating
Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013), and Mark J. Roe, Corporate
Short-Termism in the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977 (2013), with John C.
Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate
Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016), Yvan Allaire & Frangois Dauphin, 'Activist" Hedge Funds:
Creators of Lasting Wealth? What Do the Empirical Studies Really Say?, INST. FOR GOVERNANCE
PRIV. & PUB. ORGS. (July 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstractid=2460920
[https://perma.cc/C4WM-M7KY], Martin Lipton, The Bebchuk Syllogism, HARV. L. SCH. F. (Aug.
26, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/26/the-bebchuk-syllogism/ [https://perma.cc/
M7VM-WML9] [hereinafter Lipton, Bebchuk Syllogism], and Marty Lipton, The New Paradigm:
A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors
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disagree about whether there are structural impediments to achieving
that goal. 78
Seen from this angle, it is not clear that the shareholder-
conscience model is really any different from the traditional view that
managers should promote long-term shareholder value.79 It is true that
the model might offer different strategic advice about how best to
achieve that goal.s0 But even Milton Friedman-the most prominent
foil for shareholder-conscience theorists-endorsed the use of "social
conscience" in strategic service of firm profitability.8 1 In the end, then,
the normative model of shareholder conscience-much like its
descriptive counterpart-poses no real challenge to the status quo.
II. MANAGERS
Rather than looking to shareholders as the source of corporate
conscience, this Part investigates the claim that we should focus instead
on corporate managers. In doing so, it identifies two main problems
with the leading account of managerial conscience: misalignment with
shareholders' interests and imposition on corporate employees. This
dual critique calls into question the legitimacy of using corporate
authority to promote managers' own conscientious interests and
thereby supplies reasons to reject the managerial view of corporate
conscience.
78. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 77; Lipton, Bebchuk Syllogism, supra note 77. For
example, participants in this debate disagree about whether investors with different time horizons
can push managers to make decisions that will produce a short-term spike in share price, but that
will ultimately decrease corporate value in the long term. Compare Bebchuk et al., supra note 77,
at 1117-35, with Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face:
Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and
Think Long Term?, 66 BuS. LAW. 1, 8-11 (2010). For one recent attempt to bring clarity to this
debate, see David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013 (2013).
79. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761 (2015).
80. See Fink, supra note 74; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock's Message: Contribute
to Society, or Risk Losing Our Support, DEALBOOK (Jan. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/business/dealbook/blackrock-laurence-fink-letter.html
[https://perma.cc/PN6D-U6DE] (noting Fink's belief that "having social purpose is inextricably
linked to a company's ability to maintain its profits").
81. Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 51; see also Joseph Heath, Jeffrey Moriarty
& Wayne Norman, Business Ethics and (or as) Political Philosophy, 20 BUs. ETHICS Q. 427, 443
(2010) (noting that Friedman's work "has served as a foil for a strikingly large proportion of




The leading view of managerial conscience holds that corporate
managers should rely on their own deepest moral commitments-
especially their religious beliefs-in making business decisions.82 On
this account, business decisions are invariably moral decisions, and so
managers need a rich source of moral authority to guide them.8 3
Managers' own religious beliefs, in turn, provide them with an excellent
vocabulary or "grammar" for negotiating pervasive ethical dilemmas in
the business world.84
One way that managers' religious beliefs might be
operationalized-or "translated"-into business is through their
fiduciary duties.85 Among these fiduciary duties, corporate managers
have a fundamental obligation to act in "good faith."86 This obligation
has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate,87 with one
prominent commentator arguing that the duty of good faith should be
interpreted in light of religious teachings.88 On this view, religious
managers should use the duty of good faith as a "linguistic entry point"
for incorporating their own religious beliefs and traditions into their
business decisions.89 In doing so, managers should be vocal about their
82. See, e.g., Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 40; Lyman Johnson, A Role for Law and
Lawyers in Educating (Christian) Business Managers about Corporate Purpose 29, 32 (U. St.
Thomas, Working Paper No. 08-22, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1260979 [https://perma.cc/6S7V-BP34] [hereinafter Johnson, Law and
Lawyers]; see also ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE
SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 179-205 (2010); Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private
Square, 51 HOuS. L. REV. 1 (2013); Susan J. Stabile, Using Religion To Promote Corporate
Responsibility, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839 (2004). This Section addresses the leading view of
managerial conscience, which focuses on religion. Many of my criticisms in Section IIB, however,
apply equally to nonreligious "comprehensive" conceptions of the good. See Rawls, supra note 50,
at 13 (distinguishing between "political" and "comprehensive" doctrines).
83. See Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 6, at 91; see also Johnson, Faithfulness, supra
note 7, at 3.
84. See Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 5, 44.
85. See Johnson, Law and Lawyers, supra note 82, at 30, 31.
86. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 753 (Del. Ch. 2005).
87. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good
Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559 (2008); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith
in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter
and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007).
88. See Johnson, Law and Lawyers, supra note 82, at 31, 34; see also Johnson, Faithfulness,
supra note 7, at 5.
89. Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 25; see also Johnson, Law and Lawyers, supra
note 82, at 28; Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 6, at 97 (citing Robert K. Vischer, The Morally
Distinct Corporation: Reclaiming the Relational Dimension of Conscience, 5 J. CATH. SOC.
THOUGHT 323 (2008)).
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religious motivations and proudly invoke them as reasons for shaping
corporate policy and particular courses of corporate action.90
Proponents of moralized management recognize that most
corporations are not run on their preferred model.91 Indeed, they tend
to see the separation of deep convictions and business practice as a
regrettable feature of the modern corporate landscape.92 In their view,
advocates of the law and economics approach to corporate law-along
with their unrealistic assumptions of rational self-interest among
market participants-have crowded out those who might wish to bring
a more profound sense of purpose to business affairs.93 And so,
proponents of this model seek to "de-secularize" the corporate world-
to bring the richness of religious perspective to the amoral world of
corporate management. 9
To support their case, advocates of moralized management offer
a number of arguments in its favor. The first focuses on benefits for
religious individuals. The basic claim here is that it is unfair to expect
deeply religious people to leave their convictions at home when they
come to work. Religion is often at the core of people's identities, and, on
this view, it cannot be partitioned or compartmentalized so as to keep
it out of the business world. To demand that religious people deny their
full selves in the workplace would strip them of the opportunity to live
coherent lives.95 And given that Americans spend more and more of
their time at the office, they should be free to integrate their faith into
daily work. 96
90. See Johnson, Law and Lawyers, supra note 82, at 30-31; see also Johnson, Faithfulness,
supra note 7, at 17.
91. See Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 34 (arguing that norms of self-interest
dominate current corporate practice); cf. Michael A. Helfand & Barak D. Richman, The Challenge
of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 DUKE L.J. 769 (2015) (discussing businesses that are run according
to religious principles); Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the
Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARv. L. REV. F. 273
(2014) (same).
92. See Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 4.
93. See id. at 31; Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 6, at 90; Stabile, supra note 82, at 856,
884.
94. See, e.g., Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 6 (discussing the benefits of "de-
secularizing corporate discourse").
95. See id. at 35, 36; Vischer, supra note 82, at 202; see also Colombo, supra note 82, at 19;
Johnson, Law and Lawyers, supra note 82, at 31, 32; Lyman Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of
Corporate Responsibility, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 957, 962 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson, Reclaiming
an Ethic]; Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 6, at 83.
96. See Colombo, supra note 82, at 87; see also DAVID W. MILLER, GOD AT WORK: THE HISTORY
AND PROMISE OF THE FAITH AT WORK MOVEMENT 125-53 (2007).
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A second argument for moralized management appeals to the
benefits of pluralism.97 The idea here is that we should want to move
toward a corporate system in which individual businesses are less
homogeneous. Proponents of moralized management end to think that
the modern business world is rather monolithic-that the norms of
profit maximization dominate the hearts and minds of most
participants, even those who might otherwise bring diverse ethical
perspectives.98 But if we encourage corporate managers to infuse their
own consciences into the businesses they run, then many different
corporate stakeholders can associate with those firms in an effort to live
out their deepest commitments.99 Just as having a diverse group of
voluntary associations provides the benefits of pluralism in civil society,
so, too, might religiously infused businesses better mirror society as a
whole and enrich our communal lives.100
A third argument for moralized management is that infusing
religion into business has the potential to achieve a variety of socially
responsible objectives.101 These objectives could include protection of
the environment, support for local communities, choosing ethically
minded suppliers, or fair treatment of corporate employees.102 Where
previous arguments for corporate social responsibility have fallen short,
religious arguments and beliefs might be able to supply the missing
normative foundation.0 3
A final argument for moralized management is that it might
help religion itself. On this view, if we encourage more people to be vocal
about their religious views in the workplace, then we might begin to
break down the barriers to faith-based conversation in public life.104 For
example, one commentator argues that we have become "skittish" about
offering religious arguments to our fellow citizens, which has
impoverished public discourse.10 5 Others contend that religious
viewpoints are unfairly excluded from our public conversations,
denying religious citizens their right to participate in democracy on
97. See Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 37.
98. See Vischer, supra note 82, at 195-96 (discussing the disconnect between former Enron
CEO Ken Lay's personal religious beliefs and Enron's culture of profit maximization).
99. See id. at 179-205; Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 38.
100. See Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 6.
101. See Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 6, at 102-03.
102. See Stabile, supra note 82, at 842.
103. See Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 6; Stabile, supra note 82, at 873.
104. See Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 31, 45.
105. Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 6, at 102.
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equal terms.1 06 In any event, if we encourage religious people to manage
businesses in accord with their faith, then perhaps that ethic will spill
over into broader domains of democratic deliberation.
B. The Trouble with Managerial Conscience
At the outset, the case for moralizing managers would seem to
run directly into a classic problem in corporate law and policy: agency
costs. Agency costs result from the misalignment of interests between
shareholders and managers,107 and are often thought to be the "master
problem" of corporate law. 08 If corporate managers are supposed to
make business decisions in accord with their own deepest moral and
religious beliefs, this problem of misalignment is likely to be quite
significant.
To see why, it is important to recall that most shareholders
invest in corporations to build wealth for things like retirement or their
children's education.109 To achieve these goals, ordinary investors
overwhelmingly put their money in diversified investment vehicles,
including mutual funds and pension funds.1'0 The result is that most
public equity in the United States is currently held by institutional
investors specializing in management of diversified investment
portfolios.'
106. See, e.g., STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 3-101 (1993); CHRISTOPHER J.
EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN LIBERAL POLITICS 109-51 (2002); MICHAEL J. PERRY,
RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 43-61 (1999); Michael
McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH:
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 90-110 (Nancy Rosenblum ed., 2000);
Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should Be
Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 3 UTAH L. REV. 639 (1999).
107. For foundational work on agency-cost analysis, see Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
108. Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 929
(1984).
109. See Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?, supra note 76, at 1874, 1882; see also Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling
Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451 (2014) [hereinafter Strine,
Ordinary Investors].
110. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013) (describing
the structure of modern capital markets); Nelson, Illusion of Symmetry, supra note 60 (same).
111. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 110, at 864-65; Nelson, Illusion of Symmetry, supra note
60, at 2011 n.218.
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As a consequence of tax policy, moreover, ordinary investors'
funds tend to be committed to the stock market for the long term.112
Given this long-term orientation, most beneficial owners of corporate
stock are interested in the reliable financial growth of their investment
portfolios.113 Indeed, as a result of current practices with regard to
retirement savings, many individuals are now highly dependent on
these financial returns. 114
But the goal of long-term wealth creation for ordinary investors
appears to be at odds with the argument for moralized management.
Moralized managers are supposed to be motivated not merely by the
financial interests of investors, but rather by their own deepest
spiritual commitments. That is, moralized management is supposed to
transcend money by taking focus away from "unbridled" profit
seeking115 and turning it toward a higher set of moral ends. The priority
of financial gain, on this view, is regrettable11 6 and requires a search for
deeper sources of moral authority to overcome the "hegemony" of
money.117 The result of this view, then, would seem to be a serious
misalignment between moralized managers and ordinary corporate
investors.
Given this pronounced misalignment, shareholders seeking to
grow their money for retirement or for funding their children's
education would seem to have a strong objection to moralized
management. To be sure, managers have a real interest in maintaining
their own moral and religious identities. But they have a much weaker
claim to do so with shareholders' money. And while shareholders are
not without their own deep commitments,118 by and large they do not
invest their money in corporations so that managers can keep
themselves morally and religiously pure. Instead, most shareholders
want their money to grow in a reliable and durable fashion.119
112. See Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?, supra note 76, at 1878-79; see also Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Court's Role in Eroding "We the People's" Ability to
Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 423, 444 (2016) [hereinafter Strine,
Power Ratchet].
113. Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?, supra note 76, at 1882, 1884.
114. See id. at 1880.
115. See Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 6, at 95.
116. See id. at 84.
117. See Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 31 (arguing that discourse in corporate law
and theory has been demoralized "largely due to the hegemony of finance language").
118. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
119. See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1440 (2006); Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?, supra note 76.
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The frequency of divergence between the interests of moralizing
managers and ordinary shareholders, then, would make moralizing
managers a major source of agency costs. Under the traditional model
of corporate law and governance, according to which managers pursue
shareholder wealth, there is typically little reason to worry about
serious and systematic misalignment with shareholder interests. But
the moralized-management view turns those assumptions on their
head, which ought to result in heightened worries about managers' use
of shareholder money. 120
One way to respond to this concern about agency costs is to claim
that the shareholder franchise confers legitimacy on moralizing
managers. In the usual course of business, moralizing managers may
be viewed as unfaithful agents if they pursue their own conception of
the good against shareholders' wishes. But given that shareholders are
free to kick managers out of office, their failure to do so would indicate
that moralizing managers are indeed acting in shareholders' best.
interests, even if those interests are nonfinancial. In other words,''
moralizing managers are not properly viewed as a source of agency costs.
when shareholders tacitly endorse their moral goals.121
But there are a few ways in which this response is unsatisfying.
To begin with, the shareholder franchise plays a very limited role in
corporate governance generally.122 Corporate elections are typically
uncontested, which means that shareholders have no real choice among
candidates.12 3 Shareholders may choose to withhold their votes for
particular nominees, but the default rule in corporate law is that
director elections are governed by simple plurality voting.12 4
Shareholders dissatisfied with management's nominees may wish to
120. For an analogous argument regarding corporate political spending, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J.
923 (2013). On the idea that religious management is "on-the-job consumption," see Harold
Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory ofthe Firm, 26 J.L. & EcON. 375, 382 (1983).
121. See Alan Meese, Hobby Lobby and Corporate Social Responsibility: A View from the Right,
THE CONGLOMERATE (July 16, 2014), http://scholarship.aw.wm.edu/cgil
viewcontent.cgi?article=1327&context=popular media [https://perma.cc/TM5C-48MM] (arguing
that shareholders are perfectly free to opt out of the default rule of profit maximization and allow
managers to pursue religious objectives); see also Meese & Oman, supra note 91 (same). For the
argument that tacit consent validates religious exemption claims, see Michael A. Helfand,
Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value of Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539
(2015).
122. See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129,
130 (2009).
123. See Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1399 (2006).
124. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3). All other matters in which the shareholders are
entitled to vote are governed by majority voting. See, e.g., id. § 216(2).
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run their own slate of candidates, but they do not typically have access
to the corporate proxy to facilitate their efforts.125 Under these
circumstances, a select group of powerful shareholders may wish to
launch proxy contests, but the expenses of doing so are often
prohibitive.126 And even when they are not, shareholder votes bundle
together a variety of issues on which shareholders may have views,
which means that those votes cannot send a clear signal on any
particular issue.127 Shareholders can make their voices heard on
specific issues under the so-called "town-meeting rule," which allows
them to include proposals in company proxy materials.128 But these
proposals are supposed to be cast in precatory language and are
generally nonbinding. 129
Given these limitations, commentators have observed that the
shareholder franchise is best seen as a rather blunt tool to prevent gross
deviations from shareholder value in contexts particularly ripe for self-
dealing.130 In other words, shareholder voting is a means of "error
correction," not ongoing governance. When managers substantially
frustrate shareholders' financial expectations, those shareholders can
step in and right the ship.13 1 But corporate voting is not an effective
means of aggregating shareholder preferences with regard to religious,
moral, or philosophical issues. 132
This observation about the shareholder franchise is especially
important given the structure of modern capital markets. The vast
majority of public company shares are now held by institutional
investors, including pension funds and mutual funds, which exercise
voting power on behalf of beneficial owners.133 This institutional
intermediation-or the "separation of ownership from ownership"134 -
125. See Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 758 (2013); Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate
Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 677 (2016).
126. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 173-77 (5th ed. 2016); Rodrigues, supra note 123, at 1399.
127. See Bebchuk, supra note 43, at 857.
128. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. (2018).
129. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 126, at 208; Pollman; supra note 125, at 677.
130. See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 122, at 138; Rodrigues, supra note 123, at 1399.
131. See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 122, at 151.
132. See Pollman, supra note 125, at 676 (arguing that "the shareholder franchise is not a
device to aggregate the political, social, or religious values of shareholders . . . .").
133. See Nelson, Illusion of Symmetry, supra note 60, at 2011-16 (2016) (describing pervasive
intermediation in modern capital markets).
134. Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from
Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1828 (2011); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and
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further hinders moral preference aggregation though the shareholder
franchise.135 That is, capital market intermediation places an
additional layer between shareholders' consciences and the corporate
ballot box, which tends to filter out nonfinancial preferences. 136 The rise
of institutional investors may encourage passive investment by making
low-cost diversification widely available, but it does not facilitate
moralized use of the shareholder franchise.137 We should therefore
resist the idea that the shareholder vote functions as a generally
available legitimizing mechanism for moralized management. 138
At this point, a proponent of moralized management might take
issue with the emphasis on agency costs in the first place. Although
agency-cost analysis has dominated corporate law scholarship for
decades, some commentators think that it is overdone.13 9 Instead of
focusing so much on what distant and largely "absent" shareholders
want,1 4 0 the idea here is that we should focus more on the interests of
other members of the "corporate group."141 Although dispersed and
diversified modern shareholders might be pathologically focused on
corporate profits, other members of the corporate group-those with a
Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational
System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2007).
135. See Pollman, supra note 125, at 674, 677.
136. See Nelson, Illusion of Symmetry, supra note 60, at 2010-16 (discussing the attenuation
of shareholder-conscience claims in modern public corporations).
137. See Pollman, supra note 125, at 679. Things appear to be different in the context of close
corporations. When ownership and control are united, it becomes plausible to think that the
shareholder franchise effectively aggregates investor preferences. See Thompson & Edelman,
supra note 122, at 151; Rodrigues, supra note 123, at 1399 n.50. Under these circumstances,
shareholder voting may alleviate worries about agency costs that accompany moralized
management. See Meese & Oman, supra note 91, at 282-83. But in firms characterized by the
separation of ownership and control, shareholder voting is unlikely to have a similar kind of
cleansing effect. Yet many proponents of moralized management do not limit their proposals to
close corporations. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 33, at 26 (arguing that claims to
religious exemptions should not be limited to closely held corporations); Lyman Johnson et al.,
Comments on the HHS' Flawed Post-Hobby Lobby Rules 3 (Hofstra Law Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2014-23) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2512860 [https://perma.cc/SRV5-QSLV] (same).
138. See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 122, at 138 ('Thus the vote by shareholders
exhibits less of the legitimizing function in the selection of directors than one sees in a political
election of a representative, and more of the error-correcting purpose as to directors' behavior.");
see also Rodrigues, supra note 123, at 1390 (arguing that the shareholder franchise does not serve
the same legitimizing function as citizens' votes).
139. See, e.g., Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic, supra note 95, at 958; see also Matthew T. Bodie,
The Next Iteration of Progressive Corporate Law, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739, 741-48 (2017); cf.
Joseph Heath, The Uses and Abuses of Agency Theory, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 497 (2009) (providing a
"qualified defense" of agency theory).
140. Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic, supra note 95, at 958.
141. Id.
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much closer connection to actual business operations-might benefit
from more spiritually rich management.14 2
The most obvious candidates for these spiritual benefits within
the corporate group would seem to be those who work for the
corporation-that is, corporate employees. Although employees are
often omitted from discussions of corporate governance, progressive
corporate lawyers have long argued that this omission is mistaken,
14 3
and prominent scholars continue to advocate for more attention to
employees in corporate law. 144
With regard to corporate employees, proponents of moralized
management are right to focus on the value of religious accommodation
in the workplace. Indeed, employees spend much of their lives at work,
and it would be unfair to demand that they leave all traces of their
religious identities at the office door. If religious convictions had to be
expunged from the marketplace entirely, many people would be forced
to pay a high price in order to participate in economic life. 14 5
But there is a significant difference between accommodating the
religious beliefs of ordinary employees and managing a corporation in
accord with particular religious principles. Modern business
corporations-particularly large businesses-are made up of people
with a diverse array of beliefs, projects, and commitments. When these
diverse employees seek accommodations for their religious beliefs or
practices, they are seeking relief from the use of corporate authority
over their conduct. But when managers attempt to infuse religion into
corporate decisionmaking, they seek to harness that same corporate
authority to impose their beliefs. This use of hierarchical authority-
the "fiat" of corporate management l46-transforms the moral character
of managers' claims for religious liberty. Religious accommodation in
142. See Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 6, at 105.
143. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283
(1998); Marleen A. O'Connor, Human Capital ERA Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate
Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993).
144. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L. J. 819,
836 (2017) ("American organizational law-particularly corporate law-has failed to appreciate
the extent to which employees participate in the life of the firm."); Bodie, supra note 139, at 760
(arguing that "the fate of employees should be of particular concern to progressives' hearts").
145. For a forceful argument to this effect, see Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the
Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 872-74.
146. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937); see also Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
547, 552-59 (2002); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1697 (2001); Oliver E.
Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON.
REV. 112, 114 (1971).
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the workplace is undoubtedly important, but it does not entitle
corporate managers to leverage corporate power to impose their own
religious beliefs.14 7
Proponents of moralized management might reply that this
concern for ordinary employees gives short shrift to managers' interests
in freely exercising their consciences. On this view, concerns about
accommodation in the workplace cannot be limited to lower levels of the
corporate hierarchy. Managers are people, too, and their religious
beliefs should be taken just as seriously as the beliefs of those whom
they manage.
It is certainly true that managers have significant interests in
exercising their own religion. But if corporate managers run businesses
on particular religious principles, it is hard to imagine that employees
will not feel pressure to conform.148 The moralized-management view
counsels senior managers to infuse religion into their business
decisions. Moreover, it urges managers to be candid about doing so.14 9
Under these conditions, employees will surely get the message that.
religion is driving business decisions. Responsible managers may try to
dispel the notion that employee devotion will be rewarded-or a lack
thereof punished-but employees concerned about their jobs or career
advancement will likely feel considerable pressure to stay on
management's good side. Moralizing managers, then, would put
nonadherents in a very precarious position. 150
A proponent of moralized management might then reply that
employees can simply change jobs if they do not subscribe to a corporate
manager's particular religious beliefs. That is, exit is a viable option for
employees who are dissatisfied with their employers' religious
147. See James D. Nelson, Corporate Disestablishment, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
148. See [1 Free Exercise and Fairness] KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION
330 (2006) ("When employers base decisions on religious criteria, workers are thereby made
susceptible to a particular form of outside pressure in deciding what religion, if any, to practice.").
149. See Johnson, Faithfulness, supra note 7, at 41; Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 6, at
102.
150. See GREENAWALT, supra note 148, at 338 (arguing that maintaining unfavorable
conditions of employment for nonadherents discriminates against them). Harms to employees
become even more concrete and severe when managers claim religious exemptions from general
laws that protect corporate employees. See Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah
Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby's Bitter Anniversary, BALKINIZATION (Jun. 30, 2015),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/06/hobby-lobbys-bitter-anniversary.html [https://perma.cc/
PV8G-TZXB] (disputing Justice Alito's claim in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby that a religious exemption
from the contraceptive mandate would have "precisely zero" effect on Hobby Lobby's female
employees, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014)).
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management. Rather than insisting that certain managers change their
practices, corporate employees are free to "vote with their feet."151
Although exit may be possible in theory, leaving a job involves
prohibitive costs for many employees. To begin with, exit is often
expensive because employees tend to make significant firm-specific
investments that cannot easily be transferred to a different employer. 152
Moreover, even putting aside firm-specific investments, the practical
mechanics of job change involve considerable transition costs. These
costs include time and effort spent searching for suitable new
employment,153 difficulties in finding another job that calls for similar
skills and experience,15 4 and the increasing likelihood that a
replacement job would involve a pay cut.155
In addition to its high cost, exit may not always sufficiently
address employees' concerns with moralizing managers. Currently,
most companies do not infuse religious beliefs into their ordinary
management practices. But on the moralizing-manager view, the
business world may look very different. If most Americans-including
most corporate managers-are religious people, and if managers are
supposed to manage corporations in accord with their religious beliefs,
then there is no guarantee that employee exit from one job will ensure
new employment in a religiously neutral environment. 156
These factors combine to emphasize the familiar point that labor
is less mobile-or less "liquid"-than capital. 157 This feature of the labor
market, in turn, puts employees at a significant disadvantage in
competing for power within modern firms.158 Managerial power over
employees is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, the fiat element of
corporate hierarchy is often central to the efficiency properties of firm
management. 159 But that same power provides reason to be skeptical of
151. See H. Spencer Banzhaf & Randall P. Walsh, Do People Vote with Their Feet? An
Empirical Test of Tiebout's Mechanism, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 843 (2008); Charles Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
152. See Nien-hk Hsieh, Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Republicanism, 31 SOC. THEORY &
PRAC. 115, 128 (2005) [hereinafter Hsieh, Rawlsian Justice]; Nien-h6 Hsieh, Justice in Production,
16 J. POL. PHIL. 72, 89 (2008) [hereinafter Hsieh, Justice in Production].
153. See Hsieh, Rawlsian Justice, supra note 152, at 129.
154. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate
Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 101 (2015).
155. See id. at 102 (describing the current trend toward creation of lower-paying jobs).
156. Cf. id. at 103-04 (discussing several large firms with religious missions).
157. See Sandrine Blanc, Expanding Workers' 'Moral Space': A Liberal Critique of Corporate
Capitalism, 120 J. BUS. ETHICS 473, 478 (2014); Greenfield, supra note 143, at 302, 323.
158. See Blair & Stout, supra note 35, at 326-27 (describing factors related to the decline in
employee bargaining power within firms).
159. See Coase, supra note 146.
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the idea that employee exit can solve problems of moralized
management.
A proponent of moralized management might respond to this
analysis with assurances that manager religion need not be
sectarian.160 Instead, managers who seek to infuse religion into their
business decisions can take an ecumenical approach, perhaps applying
principles common to the world's major religious traditions.161 If
managers opt for this more inclusive stance, then concerns about
religious division might seem less pressing.
Although the ecumenical approach might help to relieve some
worries about the moralizing manager, it does not answer the main
challenges. To begin with, it fails to account for those employees who do
not subscribe to the world's "major religions." 62 In the modern
workplace, where many people come together for the purpose of making
a living, there are sure to be employees who feel ostracized and
excluded, even if managers are willing to take a wide view of what!.
religious faith requires.
On the flip side, this ecumenical approach would seem to
undermine the primary benefit of moralized management, namely,
allowing deeply religious managers to live out their faith in
administering business affairs. Some religious managers may hold
ecumenical views, but many others adopt more stringent positions. For
these managers, allowing an inclusive approach to religious
management will be of little value. In fact, it may even encourage them
to water down their religious beliefs in an effort to meet the model's
standards of inclusiveness. The ecumenical approach, then, cannot save
moralized management from problems of divisiveness and exclusion.
Having identified accommodation as the strongest argument in
favor of moralized management and shown that it would come at
unacceptable costs, the remaining strands of the argument are easy to
reject. First, with regard to the purported benefits of "pluralism," we
have already seen that proponents of moralized management seem to
have things backwards. To be sure, pluralism is an important feature
of the modern workplace. It is a site where people of all faiths and
backgrounds get together and cooperate in producing valuable goods
160. See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 82, at 896-97, 900.
161. See id. at 900.
162. See America's Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/ [https://perma.cc/
48YU-7VEP] (providing statistics on rising religious diversity in America).
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and services.163 Moralizing managers would bolster pluralism on an
institutional level, with different businesses following their managers'
different conceptions of the good. But this kind of pluralism threatens
to exclude nonadherents within each of these businesses.164 Unless we
are willing to make unrealistic assumptions about workers' ability to
sort themselves religiously among businesses-assumptions that
employment law steadfastly refuses to make165-then "pluralism"
becomes a reason to reject moralized management rather than a reason
to support it.
One response to this line of argument might be that it depends
on accepting the marketplace as it currently stands, and thereby
threatens to ossify an undesirable state of affairs. That is, one reason
that employment law rejects religious sorting among businesses is that
antidiscrimination laws have made institutional pluralism impossible.
If we follow- proponents of moralized management, the marketplace
might be populated with all kinds of religious companies. Under these
alternative conditions, in which employees could pick and choose among
employers that reflect their religious sensibilities, perhaps we would be
less concerned about religious discrimination in any particular firm. 16
6
It may be true that institutional pluralism, combined with
smooth labor markets, would ease our worries about religious
discrimination in the workplace. But the variety of people's religious
beliefs and experiences is vast,167 and it seems highly unlikely that
there would be sufficient demand for corporations that satisfy all of this
variety. Perhaps more fundamentally, the assumption of smooth labor
163. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003); Elizabeth Sepper, Healthcare Exemptions and the Future of
Corporate Religious Liberty, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 305, 317 (Chad
Flanders, Zoe Robinson & Micah Schwartzman eds., 2015).
164. See Blanc, supra note 157, at 484-85 (distinguishing between pluralism "across"
corporations and pluralism "in" corporations).
165. See, e.g., EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 621 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Where
the practices of employer and employee conflict . .. it is not inappropriate to require the employer,
who structures the workplace to a substantial degree, to travel the extra mile in adjusting its free
exercise rights, if any, to accommodate the employee's Title VII rights."); Young v. Sw. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 141 (5th Cir. 1975) (explaining that Title VII provides "a means to preserve
religious diversity from forced religious conformity"); McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370
N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985) ("In a pluralistic and democratic society, government has a
responsibility to insure that all its citizens have an equal opportunity for employment, promotion,
and job retention without having to overcome the artificial and largely irrelevant barriers
occurring from gender, status, or beliefs . . . ."); see also Nelson, supra note 147 (describing this
case law in detail).
166. I thank Teddy Rave for raising this objection.
167. For foundational work on this topic, see WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE (1902).
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markets is simply not in accord with modern reality. And so, in the real
world, we are left with pervasive religious diversity in the workplace,
and we need to work out principles that address this modern
condition.168
As for the claim that religious management would promote
corporate social responsibility, there are a few reasons to be skeptical.
First, the empirical basis for this claim is highly speculative at best. It
seems to simply assume that actively religious managers will behave
more ethically than nonreligious managers and indeed more ethically
than religious managers who keep their faith private. Any evidence
supporting this assumption is anecdotal or counterfactual69 and does
not provide a sound basis to support claims made for moralized
management.
Second, proponents of moralized management assume that
religious convictions will consistently supplement public norms. 170 That
is, they seem to think that the law can only go so far in encouraging,
ethical behavior, but religious managers can augment public policy by-
voluntarily submitting to more stringent ethical standards.171 Yet
religious convictions and public norms are not always fellow travelers.
Indeed, when religious managers claim exemptions from general laws
based on religious liberty protections, they are making a direct claim
that their religious commitments are at odds with public norms.172
Some religious managers may support social causes like environmental
protection or workplace safety. But religious beliefs cut in the opposite
direction on a significant number of issues.173
Finally, the argument for moralizing managers cannot be saved
by the claim that it would be good for religion itself. It might be true
that if we encouraged religious managers to be more vocal about their
beliefs in the workplace, then they would be emboldened to be more
168. For recent work on the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, see A. John
Simmons, Ideal and Nonideal Theory, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5 (2010). For important criticisms of
ideal theory, see GERALD GAUS, THE TYRANNY OF THE IDEAL: JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (2016).
169. See, e.g., VISCHER, supra note 82, at 195-96 (suggesting that the abuses at Enron may
have been avoided had Ken Lay followed his religious beliefs in managing the company).
170. See, e.g., Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 6, at 102-03.
171. Id.
172. See Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 Nw. U. L. REV. 929, 947-63
(2018); see also Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 149 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds. 2016).
173. Examples of divergence between religious and public norms include disagreements over
the use of contraception, see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014),
payment of social security taxes, see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), and payment of a
minimum wage, see Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
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vocal about those beliefs in the political sphere. But there is reason to
doubt that more religious justifications in the political sphere would be
desirable.174 At the very least, it seems an unconvincing basis on which
to change longstanding assumptions about corporate governance in a
diverse modern marketplace.
III. SOCIETY
This Part investigates the claim that corporate conscience
should be grounded not in the personal beliefs of shareholders or
managers, but instead in the interests of society as a whole. It argues
that although this socialized view of corporate conscience identifies the
correct ends of corporate law and governance, its prescribed means are
ultimately self-defeating.
A. Socialized Corporations
The socialized view of corporate conscience begins by trying to
shift focus away from shareholder profit and toward a broader
conception of social wealth. It says that if left to their own devices,
modern business corporations cannot be expected to act with an
appropriate degree of conscience.175 Corporations, on this view, are
amoral entities that will pathologically seek profit for shareholders
while ignoring society as a whole.16 The only way to change this sad
state of affairs is to inject some concern for others through the long arm
of the law. 177
174. See RAWLS, supra note 50; see also CECILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM'S RELIGION (2017);
JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION (2011); Jonathan Quong, On the Idea of
Public Reason, in A COMPANION TO RAWLS 265-80 (Jon Mandle & David A. Reidy eds., 2014).
175. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 134, 143; see also
Greenfield, Corporate Persons, supra note 7, at 329 ("Humans have consciences; corporations do
not. Left to themselves, they will behave as if profit is the only thing that matters.").
176. See Kent Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 947, 951
(2008) [hereinafter Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate Law] (arguing that corporations
fail in part because they are "amoral"); Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New
Gilded Age, 2 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 7 (2008) [hereinafter Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate
Law] (arguing that the corporation has "no conscience of its own"); see also JOEL BAKAN, THE
CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 2 (2004) (describing the
corporation as a "pathological institution").
177. The socialized view offers a variety of proposals designed to induce corporate managers
to act in the interests of society. One common proposal is to expand corporate fiduciary duties to
cover a wider group of "stakeholders"-including employees, customers, suppliers, and local
communities. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 148. The literature
on "stakeholder" theory is now vast, but the path-breaking work was R. EDWARD FREEMAN,
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984). For more recent overviews of the
field, see Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation:
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At first glance, socialized management does not look all that
different from the mainstream view of corporate law. Indeed, as two of
the mainstream view's most prominent expositors put it, "All
thoughtful people believe that corporate enterprise should be organized
and operated to serve the interests of society as a whole, and that the
interests of shareholders deserve no greater weight in the social
calculus than do the interests of any other members of society."178 That
is, corporate enterprise should be judged on its ability to produce wealth
for everyone-to maximize the "size of the pie"-and shareholders do
not have any special moral claim to that wealth. 179
This agreement on the ends of corporate governance, however,
gives way to a fundamental disagreement about the means of achieving
social wealth. Both the mainstream view and the socialized-
management view hold that the government needs to regulate
corporate externalities-that is, to make sure that businesses
internalize the full costs of their activities. 180 But advocates of socialized
management contend that externality regulation is not enough, nor is
it even the best way to address corporate harm. Instead, they argue for
changes to the internal relationships typically thought to compose the
domain of corporate law.181 These internal reforms would focus on
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65 (1995); and R. EDWARD FREEMAN
ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART (2010). Another proposal recommends at
least some measure of board representation for these corporate stakeholders. See GREENFIELD,
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 149. Instead of board representation, Lawrence
Mitchell has argued for board entrenchment. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate
Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263 (1992). Finally, proponents of socialized management advocate
mandatory disclosure rules that would cover the social effects of businesses in addition to their
financial condition. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 149; see also
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999) (arguing that the Securities and Exchange
Commission should require expanded "social disclosure" by public companies). The unifying theme
of these proposals, though, is an effort to ensure that corporate managers act in society's best
interests, rather than only in the interests of corporate shareholders.
178. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 79, at 441.
179. See id.; see also John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate
Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 28
(2d ed. 2009) ("As a normative matter, the overall objective of corporate law-as of any branch of
law-is presumably to serve the interests of society as a whole."). This conception of social welfare
puts aside more difficult questions about the proper balance between welfare and conceptions of
fairness. For important work on that topic, see Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social
Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001); and Amartya Sen, The
Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970).
180. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 128; FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 23, 38 (1991).
181. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 146; Greenfield, Saving
the World with Corporate Law, supra note 176, at 974.
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ordinary principles of corporate governance and the nature of the
fiduciary relationships within firms.182
The leading proponent of socialized management offers what
seems to be a simple argument for this fundamental rearrangement. He
argues that externality regulation typically occurs after the fact-that
is, it happens after something has gone terribly wrong and the law
needs to come in and clean things up. 183 This kind of reactive regulation
is thought to be insufficient. The better course, on this view, would be
to empower people inside the corporation to take social wealth into
account before things go wrong. Those people have better information
about the conditions of the firm and the costs that it is likely to impose
on third parties.184 This superior information, in turn, will allow
insiders to avoid the social costs of corporate misbehavior before they
are incurred. 185
At the heart of this model is the conviction that it is "ironic" or
"awkward" to say that corporations can promote social wealth if their
participants ignore it in their day-to-day affairs.1 8 6 Rather than sticking
their heads in the sand, corporate managers should instead be more
closely attuned to the needs of society. In other words, they should adopt
social wealth as their explicit goal and make their decisions in direct
pursuit of that goal.187
B. The Trouble with Social Conscience
There is some intuitive appeal to the notion that if we want
corporations to produce social wealth, then we should not ask managers
to ignore it. But if managers are supposed to aim directly at promoting
social wealth, then they would face a serious epistemic hurdle. The
basic problem is that, aside from avoiding the most egregious abuses,
corporate managers are not likely to be very good at determining what
182. See supra note 177.
183. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 140-42.
184. See id. at 141.
185. See id. at 140-42; Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate Law, supra note 176, at
974.
186. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 126 (characterizing the
mainstream view of corporate law as ironic); id. at 136 (arguing that it is "truly awkward" to think
that corporate managers promote social wealth by ignoring it).
187. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 129, 133, 135, 141;
Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate Law, supra note 176, at 952, 974. Professor
Greenfield also makes sophisticated arguments sounding in distributive justice and workplace
fairness. Those arguments are addressed below and considered in greater detail in Nelson, supra
note 147.
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will lead to more social wealth. In the mine-run of cases, managers
simply do not have enough information to make these kinds of
decisions.18 8
The main reason for this difficulty is that the information
managers would need to determine proper social ends is widely
dispersed and highly complex. 189 Good corporate managers are noted
for their ability to attend to the needs of their own businesses and their
bottom lines. They are, or should be, expert in their own organizations
and capable of executing beneficial transactions for their firms. But
there is little reason to believe that even the best corporate managers
are particularly adept at knowing what is in the best interests of an
entire society. 190
On the traditional view, this epistemic problem can be addressed
through competition. 191 In a market economy, competition leads to the
emergence of a set of prices that conveys critical information to other
market participants. Indeed, on one influential account, the chief
benefit of competition is that it serves as a "discovery procedure" that.
allows people to acquire and communicate knowledge to which no one
person has access. 192 The price system, in turn, serves to coordinate the
actions of many different people, none of whom need to know the full
story of how those prices were determined to make socially beneficial
decisions.193
It is through this decentralized system of prices that competition
leads to allocative efficiency.19 4 When firms compete to gain market
share, they tend to move toward more efficient methods of production.
These gains in efficiency allow them to offer consumers lower prices
188. See F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945)
[hereinafter Hayek, Use of Knowledge]; see also David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social
Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 70 (1979) ("[M]anagement cannot be expected to discern, on a
regular basis and with any degree of certainty, that particular acts of substantive altruism are
called for by consensus ocial goals.").
189. See Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 188, at 519-22.
190. See Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 51. Perhaps the social-conscience claim
could be stated more modestly. Instead of claiming that managers should aim directly at social
wealth in making their decisions, one could argue for a sort of "do no harm" principle, according to
which managers simply seek to avoid conduct that harms the interests of society. But even this
modest "do no harm" claim appears parasitic on a substantive view of what promotes social wealth,
and therefore it is subject to the same kinds of epistemic limitations I am describing.
191. See, e.g., Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 188, at 521.
192. See F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 67-70 (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY]; see also Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 188, at 520.
193. See HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, supra note 192, at 68-69.
194. See CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 191-225 (2007).
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than their competitors. The downward pressure on prices forces other
producers to respond in kind-to adapt or face failure. As firms continue
to engage in this iterative process of competition, prices fall until they
reach the point at which markets clear.195 This is not necessarily
advantageous for individual producers who might rather charge
monopolistic prices in a noncompetitive environment. But the market
system is a sort of "institutionalized collective action problem"
198 that
reveals the least-cost provider of goods and services and, in turn, allows
for resources to flow toward their most valued uses. The result of this
competitive process is a massive gain in social wealth.197
The profit motive, for its part, is what sustains this competitive
system. If producers are aiming not at overall social good, but instead
at what will deliver the most profit for their own firms, then they will
put their knowledge and skills to work in creating valuable products
and services at the lowest cost. 198 And as firms attempt to gain market
share by operating more efficiently, resources will flow to the most
efficient producers. The contention here is certainly not that profit
seeking is intrinsically good. Instead, the profit motive gives market
participants the right incentives to compete, which in turn allows the
price system to perform its allocative function. 199
With these familiar principles in mind, it becomes easier to see
why commentators worry about the efficiency losses that might attend
relaxation of the profit motive.200 By instructing managers to consider,
first and foremost, the interests of society as a whole, socialized
management undercuts the informational advantages of robust market
competition. If managers are no longer expected-either by law or by
ethical custom-to compete in the primary hopes of increasing firm
profits, then prices will be less capable of aggregating and conveying
information that would help guide society's allocation of resources. The
result will be distorted markets and socially inefficient production
decisions.
Of course, in the real world, markets are imperfect. Mainstream
corporate law commentators have long recognized this inescapable fact,
but they argue that the government can minimize the consequences of
195. See HEATH, supra note 50, at 9.
196. Id. at 99.
197. See MENGER, supra note 194, at 222-25.
198. Id. at 224-25.
199. See HEATH, supra note 50, at 7.
200. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 79, at 443-44.
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imperfect competition by regulating externalities.20 1 A classic example
would be passing environmental laws aimed at curbing the social costs
of pollution. On the conventional view, the government should enact
across-the-board regulations that would force companies polluting the
environment to internalize the costs of their activities.202 Doing so
would change the "prices" firms confront, but it would leave intact their
basic orientation toward maximizing profit. 203
Proponents of socialized management argue that the better
course would be not simply to change the prices that firms encounter,
but also the overall goal at which they are aiming.204 The leading
advocate of socialized management devotes significant attention to the
example of pollution.205 In his view, the mainstream account counsels
companies to pollute as much as they want, and then asks the
government to tax those companies for the cost of cleanup.206 But the
socialized-management view argues instead that we should change the
calculus inside of firms by requiring management to account for
environmental interests along with a host of other goals in making.
business decisions.207 The case for socializing management, then, rests ,
on the idea that businesses themselves have better information about
how to avoid pollution at low cost, and that the social cost of cleanup
would vastly exceed the cost of preventative measures.208
But there are a few ways in which this analysis is unsatisfying.
First, it seems to ignore the fact that reactive regulatory measures can
have profound effects going forward. For example, if the government
imposes pollution regulations that cost firms money, those regulations
will be subject to ex ante price internalization.2 0 9 In other words, if.
201. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 180, at 38; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note
79, at 442.
202. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 180, at 38; see also ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007).
203. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 180, at 38. This analysis assumes that businesses
are not able to skew the political process in their favor through lobbying or election spending. For
a recent discussion of corporate political influence, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., & Nicholas Walter,
Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and
Citizens United, 100 CORNELLL. REV. 335, 390 (2015). For skepticism about the extent of corporate
political influence, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Night-
Watchman State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 39, 45-48 (2015).
204. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 135-41.
205. Id. at 141-42.
206. Id. at 141.
207. Id. at 134-42.
208. Id. at 141-46.
209. See PIGOU, supra note 202; POSNER, supra note 202; see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL,
WALLACE E. OATES & SUE ANNE BATEY, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALITY
OF LIFE 230-45 (1979); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004);
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regulation "raises the price" of pollution-as the mainstream corporate
law crowd would have it-that price will be accounted for in firms'
pollution decisions in the future. To be sure, externality regulation will
be imperfect, especially for industries in which regulated parties exert
significant political influence over their regulators.210 Yet even
imperfect externality regulation will influence profit-maximizing firms'
decisions regarding pollution, and will do so without fundamentally
changing those firms' basic operating goals.211
In addition, when we use externality regulation to raise the price
of corporate pollution, we still allow firms to compete over who can
achieve compliance at the lowest cost. Before the regulation goes into
effect, it may not be clear which firms will come out ahead. But again,
the process of market competition will reveal who can adapt to the new
regulatory environment and operate most efficiently. In fact, it may
well be the case that a firm can figure out how to engineer its production
process so that it avoids pollution at lower costs than anticipated.212
And that's because without a competitively structured environment in
which producers are led by their own interests in profit, it would not be
possible to discover the true costs of reducing pollution.213 And so,
changing firms' overall goal, and not simply the prices they confront,
may not only reduce corporate wealth, but may also diminish firms'
incentives to develop innovative solutions to the problem of pollution
itself.2 1
4
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93, 100-04
(2015) (discussing the theory of Pigouvian taxation); Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus
Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful Externalities, 54 J. L. & ECON. S249 (2011).
210. See Strine & Walter, supra note 203; see also John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the
First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 269 (2015)
("Concentrated, moneyed interests, represented by those in control of the country's largest
business corporations, are increasingly able to turn law into a lottery, reducing law's predictability,
impairing property rights, and increasing the share of the economy devoted to rent-seeking rather
than productive activity."); Hart & Zingales, supra note 45, at 249 ("Like many people these days
(and maybe always), we are not that sanguine about the efficiency of the political process.").
211. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 591 (2003) ("General welfare laws designed to deter wrongful
corporate conduct through criminal and civil sanctions imposed on the corporation, its directors,
and its senior officers are more efficient than stakeholderist tweaking of director fiduciary duties,
which by virtue of their inherent ambiguity are a blunt instrument.").
212. See HEATH, supra note 50, at 223-24 (discussing how the introduction of a market for
sulfur dioxide emissions permits revealed that reducing emissions was much cheaper than
industry participants and regulators had predicted).
213. See id. at 224; see also TIM HARFORD, THE UNDERCOVER ECONOMIST: REVISED & UPDATED
102-04 (2012) (discussing the EPA's efforts to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions).
214. For an argument along these lines, see Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1447-48 (1989):
2018] THE TROUBLE WITH CORPORATE CONSCIENCE 1693
These well-known market dynamics, in turn, make it hard to see
the mainstream view of corporate law and policy as "ironic" or
"awkward." It does not take some leap of faith in the invisible hand to
see the efficiency benefits of competition.215 Motivated by the prospect
of making a profit, businesses compete for market share. In doing so,
they are engaged in a deliberately adversarial process that harnesses
the profit motive in service of socially efficient resource allocation.216
And so the idea that competition channels individual interests into
socially beneficial results is not strange-it is the whole point of the
modern market system. Managers are simply playing their important-
but highly circumscribed-role in that system.217
At this point, a proponent of socialized management might offer
several replies. One claim might be that socialized management is not
only concerned with promoting social wealth, but also with the fair
distribution of that wealth.218 This is a serious objection to the
traditional view of corporate law, which tends to focus on promoting,
social wealth and typically kicks concerns about distributive justice to.
other areas of the law, especially tax law.2 1 9
Arguments grounded in the efficiency of competitive markets
cannot fully answer this egalitarian objection. That is, no matter how
Nothing in our approach asks whether political society should attempt to make firms
behave as if they have the welfare of nonparticipants in mind. .. . Society must choose
whether to conscript the firm's strengths (its tendency to maximize wealth) by changing
the prices it confronts, or by changing the structure so that it is less apt to maximize
wealth. The latter choice will yield less of both good ends than the former.;
see also ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 33
(1776) ("By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually
than when he really intends to promote it.").
215. The term "invisible hand" comes from ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS
(1759); and ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776).
216. HEATH, supra note 50, at 93-115.
217. Joseph Heath makes an analogy to criminal defense lawyers. He notes that the criminal
justice system is designed to be adversarial, and that the role of defense lawyers is circumscribed
accordingly. They are supposed to provide zealous advocacy for their clients (within limits); they
are not supposed to aim at "justice" directly. HEATH, supra note 50, at 84-85. For more on the
distinction between criminal defense lawyers' "narrow goal" and the "broad goal" of the criminal
justice system, see LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST
EXPORT 82 (2001).
218. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 145-46 (arguing that
corporate law should also promote distributive justice).
219. See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 126; ROBERT W. HAMILTON, JONATHAN R.
MACEY & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS
AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (11th ed. 2010); WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER &
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND CORPORATIONS (9th ed. 2015).
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well the price mechanism works to allocate resources efficiently in
society, concerns about fair distribution will retain much of their force.
What the argument from competition can do, however, is cast the
egalitarian objection as a rather stark trade-off. If one wishes to move
toward a socialized model of the modern business corporation, it is
critical to notice that this move would come with significant losses in
efficiency.220 Those losses may or may not be justified once we balance
the benefits of a more egalitarian marketplace against the burdens of
socially inefficient resource allocation. At the very least, a proponent of
the fairness version of socialized management would need to show why
distributional goals are best carried out by corporate managers rather
than by a government-coordinated progressive tax program.221
In any event, if socialized management is understood as
primarily aimed at promoting overall social wealth, then it should be
seen as largely self-defeating. The profit motive is the engine for a
competitive market economy. It leads businesses to compete in hopes of
capturing the most value for their own firms. These competitive
activities, mediated through the price system, provide critical
information about what should be produced, where it should be
produced, and by whom it should be produced. There is no single actor-
not a central planner and not a corporate manager-that can match the
price system in ensuring that resources flow to their most valued
uses.222
A proponent of socialized management might instead reply that
the theory is primarily concerned with building wealth for corporate
"stakeholders" and not necessarily with promoting the interests of
society as a whole.22 3 As an initial matter, it is worth noting that broad
definitions of who counts as a stakeholder threaten to make this
distinction illusory. For example, if the term stakeholder includes not
only employees, customers, and creditors, but also suppliers, local
220. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 79, at 443-49.
221. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL. STUD. 667 (1994). Of course, there is reason to
be skeptical that such a progressive tax program will be politically feasible in the near future. See
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.
222. See Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 188, at 520-27. For the argument that
stakeholder management in the United States would lead to a global flight of capital, see
D. Gordon Smith, The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 985, 1005-09 (2008).
223. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 142 ("(Cjorporations have
a comparative advantage in building wealth for all of its stakeholders.").
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communities, and even governments, then there is no longer a clear
distinction between corporate stakeholders and society as a whole.2 2 4
But if proponents of socialized management were to adopt a
more constrained version of stakeholder theory-setting tighter
parameters for who qualifies-then there might be some question about
the moral arbitrariness of this decision.225 Say, for example, that only
current employees would count as stakeholders. Indeed, stakeholder
theorists often pay a great deal of attention to improving the place of
workers in corporate law.226 But it is not obvious from a moral point of
view why workers' interests are more important than those of other
corporate constituents, such as creditors, customers, or members of the
local community. Now it might be the case that employees are especially
vulnerable to managerial authority, given their firm-specific
investments.227 But that vulnerability does not provide a convincing
reason to give their interests lexical priority over the interests of other
constituents that might be thought to have a "stake" in the firm. 2 28
Some have suspected that the actual stakeholders selected for'..
firms' attention-even if it is less than socialized-management,
advocates would like-are the ones who have been able to muster the
most political power to make their voices heard. This is known as the
"squeaky wheel" problem-the stakeholder that screams the loudest
gets the most attention. 229 As a descriptive matter, this account is quite
convincing. But it hardly provides a satisfying normative argument for
distinguishing among potentially deserving stakeholders.
A final reply from socialized-management theorists might be
that the goals of profit maximization and overall social wealth are not
always at odds. By acting in the interests of society as a whole, that is,
businesses can earn favorable reputations that will translate into
224. See Samantha Miles, Stakeholder: Essentially Contested or Just Confused?, 108 J. BUS.
ETHICS 285 (2012); Eric Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS.
ETHICS 605, 608 (2009); see also R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE
OF THE ART 206-08 (2010) (acknowledging difficulties with broad versions of stakeholder theory).
225. See HEATH, supra note 50, at 82; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1269 (1982) (questioning the priority of current employees over
prospective employees).
226. See, e.g., Bodie, supra note 144; Greenfield, supra note 143; O'Connor, supra note 7;
Marleen O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary
Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991).
227. For a discussion of employees' firm-specific investments, see supra notes 152-159 and
accompanying text.
228. HEATH, supra note 50, at 82-83.
229. See id. at 82.
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customer loyalty, long-term growth, and prosperity.230 But it is
important to notice that this reply fundamentally changes the terms of
the argument from social wealth. Socialized-management advocates
insist on the need for legal reform.23 1 Things are bad with the corporate
law world-it is failing and has failed us-and we need to use the full
arsenal of the law to do something about it.232 Socialized management,
in other words, is focused on what businesses owe to the rest of society.
It is not about how businesses can find a creative and friendly way to
make more money. That might be an appealing strategic theory of
corporate conscience-and one to which many, if not most, mainstream
commentators would have no objection. But that view marks a stark
departure from the normative aspirations with which the socialized-
management argument began.
One need not be entirely negative about the idea of socializing
corporations. As those prominent mainstream corporate law
commentators observed, thoughtful people agree that corporate
enterprise should be judged by its ability to produce social wealth.
233
But this agreement on the proper ends of corporate law and practice
soon gives way to a radically different vision as to the best means of
achieving the consensus goal. In the end, the idea that we should
encourage managers to aim directly at overall social wealth, and not
just at profits for their own firms, turns out to be self-defeating. It does
not take sufficient account of the efficiency properties of modern
markets. In particular, it ignores the role of the profit motive in
providing incentives for competition-competition that allocates
available social resources in the most productive and least wasteful
manner. And so, while the idea of socialized management may have its
230. This claim is often referred to as the "business case" for corporate social responsibility.
For different versions of the claim, see Bryan W. Husted & Jos6 de Jesus Salazar, Taking
Friedman Seriously: Maximizing Profits and Social Performance, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 75 (2006);
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 62 (2011);
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, 84 HARv. BUS. REV. 78 (2006); and David J. Vogel,
Is There a Market for Virtue? The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility, 47 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 19 (2005). It also falls within the category of "instrumental" or "strategic" stakeholder theory.
See Michael L. Barnett & Robert M. Salomon, Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Relationship
Between Social Responsibility and Financial Performance, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1101 (2006);
Donaldson & Preston, supra note 177, at 77-81; Amy J. Hillman & Gerald D. Keim, Shareholder
Value, Stakeholder Management, and Social Issues: What's the Bottom Line?, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 125 (2001); Thomas M. Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and
Economics, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 404 (1995).
231. See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 134-42 (arguing that
corporate law must change in a variety of ways to promote social wealth).
232. Id.
233. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 79, at 442.
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heart in the right place, it cannot provide an adequate substitute for the
marketplace as we know it.
IV. BEYOND CONSCIENCE
The previous Parts demonstrate that the leading arguments for
corporate conscience fail in critical respects. Shareholder conscience is
impractical. Moralizing managers are illegitimate. And socialized
corporations are inefficient.
Although mostly critical, this analysis need not be dispiriting. If
we are to move toward a more sophisticated moral theory for the
modern corporate world, we first need to do some serious ground
clearing. More specifically, we need a sharper sense of the various
concepts at play and an account of whether any of them survive
scrutiny.
By doing this conceptual work, in turn, we can begin to see a
path forward. The business world may not be amenable to all kinds of7
moralization. But that does not mean it is without morality entirely.
Indeed, lurking underneath this Essay's various criticisms of corporate
conscience is the idea of an "implicit morality of the market"234-a logic
to the modern commercial world-even if that morality resists leading
attempts to give corporations a conscience.
Though short of a comprehensive account, the failure of existing
arguments furnishes three initial lessons for this implicit morality.
First, as a matter of practical implementation, any implicit morality
must be realistic about the structure of modern corporations and capital.
markets.235 Theories of morality in the market that do not account for
pervasive social norms or institutional dynamics are not likely to gain
much traction in the real world.2 3 6
234. Christopher McMahon, Morality and the Invisible Hand, 10 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 247, 254
(1981); see also Wayne Norman, Is There 'a Point'to Markets? A Response to Martin, 2 BUS. ETHICS
J. REV. 22, 23 (discussing McMahon's account of the "implicit morality of the market"); HEATH,
supra note 50, at 173 (same). To the degree that these principles also address relationships within
firms, perhaps it would be more accurate to call it the implicit morality of economic organization.
See Coase, supra note 146 (distinguishing between firms and markets); see also Nelson, supra note
147 (discussing Coase's theory of the firm).
235. For an excellent discussion of how theories of business ethics must contend with facts
about the market for corporate control, see Gabriel Rauterberg, The Corporation's Place in Society,
114 MICH. L. REV. 913 (2016) (reviewing JOSEPH HEATH, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM:
THE MARKET FAILURES APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 94 (2014)).
236. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement for
Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165 (2017);
see also supra note 168 (discussing the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory).
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Second, the implicit morality of the market should take account
of widespread diversity in modern corporations. It should not endorse
any particular set of comprehensive philosophical or religious
principles.237 It should provide employers and employees alike with the
"moral space" necessary to live integrated lives.2 3 8 But it should not
allow managers to use the power of corporate hierarchy to impose their
own views of the good on others.
Third, the implicit morality of the market must be compatible
with the underlying institutional rationale for a market economy. Some
principles of moral theory-developed in the context of family or
community relations-are simply not appropriate for the market
sphere. Concern for a sibling's financial hardship does not translate into
concern for a competitor's lost profits. Parents and teachers should work
together on educational standards; competitors should not work
together on prices.
At this point, one might object to the whole project of searching
for an implicit morality of the market. The most likely grounds for this
objection would be that, by looking to the design of the system we
currently have, this method of reasoning about morals in business
favors the status quo. To put the point another way, by probing our
current practices for guidance about how businesses hould act, we are
relying on contingent facts about the world as it is instead of engaging
our critical faculties and imagining the world as it might be. On this
view, working out an implicit morality of our economic system is either
complacent or, worse yet, cynical.239
There is something tempting about the idea of scrapping the
system we have, with all its faults, and trying to reimagine the
corporate world in fundamental ways. But idealism has its drawbacks.
Perhaps the most serious is that it is overwhelmingly likely to succumb
to deep-and permanent-disagreement about the best state of the
world. And, indeed, this deep disagreement has played out over decades
in law and business scholarship with no clear winner among the
numerous comprehensive theories of corporate morality.240
As these foundational debates about morality in business go
on-and do so interminably-it would be a mistake to neglect
normative theorizing about the economic system we actually have. That
237. See Nelson, supra note 147.
238. For use of this term in the business ethics literature, see Blanc, supra note 157.
239. I thank Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol for raising this objection.
240. See Norman, supra note 234, at 22 (noting that debates in business ethics "have long been
Balkanized by overly ideological 'theories' ").
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is, the task of developing an implicit morality of the market should
not-and cannot-displace revolutionary thinking about business and
the proposals for radical reform that grow out of that thinking. But in
the meantime, there is room for a more pragmatic program that seeks
to identify widely shared principles for economic cooperation in a
modern market economy. In doing so, we can largely sidestep-or
"bracket"-the most intractable debates over morals in business and
instead look to interpret the modern- corporate world in its most
coherent and attractive form.
One important component of this interpretive project is to
foreground the commercial aspect of business corporations. Not every
institution needs to save the rainforest. Not every institution needs to
advocate for social justice. And not every institution needs to save souls.
Nonprofit organizations have long pursued these goals and done so
vigorously. To be sure, the distinction between nonprofit organizations
and for-profit businesses is blurry around the edges,2 4 1 and no.
organization can avoid commerce entirely. 242 But lines can-and have ,
been drawn,243 and those lines need to be defended according to the
characteristic advantages of different kinds of organizations.2 4 4
The characteristic advantage of business corporations is that
they are powerful tools for producing wealth. Indeed, the corporate form
is the dominant vehicle for organizing large-scale enterprises around
the world.245 Even the most ardent proponents of corporate conscience
find it difficult to resist this conclusion.2 4 6
241. See James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 468-
72 (2015) (describing arguments supporting the claim that the distinction between businesses and
nonprofits is elusive); see also Margaret M. Blair, Corporations and Expressive Rights: How the
Lines Should be Drawn, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (2016) (discussing the line-drawing difficulties
involved in determining which kinds of organizations should enjoy particular constitutional
rights); Elizabeth Pollman, Line Drawing in Corporate Rights Determinations, 65 DEPAUL L. REV.
597 (2016) (same).
242. See Nelson, supra note 241, at 470; Michael C. Dorf, The Good Society, Commerce, and
the Rehnquist Court, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2161, 2167 (2001); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts,
Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917, 1927 n.49 (2001).
243. See Blair, supra note 241 (defending line drawing that focuses on the "people" associated
with the organization and the organization's "purpose"); Nelson, supra note 241 (defending a line
between for-profit and nonprofit organizations for purposes of freedom-of-association doctrine).
244. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Necessity, Importance, and the Nature of Law, in NEUTRALITY AND
THEORY OF LAW 17-31 (Jordi Ferrer Beltrdn et al. eds., 2013) (defending a jurisprudential
approach that focuses on "the concentrated presence of non-essential properties").
245. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 126, at 75 ("From Delaware to Dushanbe, the
corporation is the standard legal form adopted by large-scale private enterprises."); Armour et al.,
supra note 179, at 1, 2 ("[I]n market economies, almost all large-scale business firms adopt a legal
form that possesses all five of the basic characteristics of the business corporation.").
246. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 142 (acknowledging
that "corporations have a comparative advantage in building wealth for all of its stakeholders").
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Nevertheless, theorists of corporate conscience press on,
claiming that business corporations can be refashioned as tools to serve
our deepest moral ambitions.247 But corporate refashioning has its
costs. When tools intended for one purpose are systematically employed
to serve secondary purposes, friction and distortion are inevitable. As
one commentator famously observed, "If there is no hammer, and if the
pipe wrench sits on the top shelf of the tool chest, then the pipe wrench
more than any of the other tools in the chest may over time lose its
ability to perform the function for which it was originally designed."248
Business corporations were designed to produce wealth for society. We
should be wary of attempts to co-opt their characteristic advantage for
largely unrelated purposes.
Reinforcing the normative grounding of different organizational
forms might also produce benefits in terms of private ordering. To the
extent that these forms provide "off-the-rack" sets of contractual default
terms, it may be desirable to have a menu of genuinely distinctive
options. That is, if different kinds of organizations provide different
arrangements of default terms based on the goals of organizers, then
those organizers will benefit ex ante from clarity and stability in their
choice of organizational form.
Focusing on corporations' characteristic advantage in producing
wealth, however, does not provide businesses with an ethical free pass.
Business corporations may not be ideal vehicles for developing our
deepest values and commitments,249 but their central role in the
distribution of basic resources carries certain moral side-constraints.
25 0
For example, corporate managers should refrain from using corporate
power to undermine the preconditions for competitive markets.251
Managers might fail to fulfill this obligation by lobbying the
government to maintain existing market failures that work in their
favor or by advocating for laws that create new anticompetitive
advantages.252
247. See, e.g., Strine, Power Ratchet, supra note 112 (adopting the view that corporations are
human creations that should suit the purposes of their creators).
248. Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 175, 195 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
249. See Nelson, supra note 38, at 1575-610.
250. On the idea of moral side constraints, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
26-53 (1974). Nozick's discussion of moral side constraints is also noted in HEATH, supra note 50,
at 90.
251. See HEATH, supra note 50. This point is a key aspect of Joseph Heath's highly influential
"market failures" approach to business ethics.
252. Id. at 113; Pierre Yves-Neron, Business and the Polis: What Does It Mean to See
Corporations as Political Actors?, 94 J. Bus. ETHICS 333, 344 (2010); see also Coates, supra note
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The implicit morality of the market should also include a
commitment to preserving broad access to economic opportunities
without regard to one's particular identity or creed. This ethic of
toleration is not only morally attractive, but it is also deeply embedded
in social practice, especially within large firms.2 5 3 The best
interpretation of the modern corporation as a social institution must be
one that vindicates norms of nondiscrimination and equal access.
Last, but not least, the implicit morality of the market should
include a presumption in favor of transparency. Modern securities laws
already reflect the value of transparency by requiring public companies
to provide a great deal of information to shareholders via mandatory
disclosure rules.2 5 4 Those rules contribute in important ways both to
share-price accuracy and to controlling wasteful agency costs.2 5 5 But
capital markets are not the only markets that benefit from low-cost
access to reliable information about firms. 2 56 If corporations are to live
up to their promise of promoting broad social wealth, then the implicit
morality of the market should also include a commitment to relieving
informational deficits throughout the economy.
This discussion of implicit principles is not meant to be
exhaustive. Instead, it seeks only to provide an initial sketch. Yet even
this initial sketch can serve as a guide for commentators who wish to
avoid the false starts of corporate conscience and work toward a more
promising view of morality in modern business.
CONCLUSION
Corporate reform can be a frustrating enterprise. All too often,
conventional legal tools are not up to the task for which we seek to use
them. The business world is complex, and its participants are
sophisticated and highly motivated to gain advantages. Under these
circumstances, it is tempting to look for structural solutions that might
address business failures on a systemic level.
210, at 268-75 (criticizing corporate rent-seeking through use of the First Amendment); Strine &
Walter, supra note 203 (arguing that there is a tension between corporate political activity and
traditional corporate theory's reliance on externality regulation to police the marketplace).
253. See ESTLUND, supra note 163.
254. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2018).
255. Paul Mahoney distinguishes two kinds of efficiency arguments for mandatory disclosure
rules under the U.S. securities laws: the "accuracy enhancement" model-concerned with share
price accuracy-and the "agency cost" model. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995).
256. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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The idea of corporate conscience looks promising from this
systemic perspective. It goes beyond typical approaches to legal
regulation and tries to reform the marketplace from within. The three
prevailing accounts of corporate conscience differ in significant ways,
and it is important to pull them apart and see the logic of arguments in
favor of each. Unfortunately for their proponents, though, none of these
accounts hold up to scrutiny.
But all is not lost for champions of corporate morality. Although
the leading accounts of corporate conscience fall short, they all do so in
illuminating ways, bringing into sharp relief the minimum
requirements for a successful theory. Any attempt to rehabilitate the
idea of corporate conscience must take these minimum requirements
seriously.
